Understanding the Dynamics of the Sudan Conflict and Its International Implications

On February 4, 2025, Al Arabiya Net reported, “The army and its supporting forces entered the southeastern parts of Khartoum State during the past hours, coming from Al-Jazeera State.” Earlier, on February 2, 2025, Youm7 website stated, “The correspondent of Cairo News Channel reported breaking news that the Sudanese army is reclaiming a number of villages east of the Nile in Khartoum State.” Prior to this, on November 1, 2025, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) were defeated by the Sudanese army in the Al-Jazeera State axis, including its capital, Wad Madani. “Commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Hemeti, admitted in an audio recording attributed to him that his forces were defeated in Al-Jazeera State” (Al-Jazeera, January 13, 2025).

Following these developments, the tide of battles in Sudan’s three capital cities—Khartoum, Bahri, and Omdurman—shifted in favor of the Sudanese army. The army regained control of several important sites in these cities, including lifting the siege on the General Command. But what is behind this rapid acceleration in the conflict? Are these local actions solely a result of the Sudanese army’s sudden emergence as a stronger force, or do these battles have international implications regarding the conflict over Sudan

To address these questions, we must first examine the following points:

First: The Acceleration of Military Operations in Sudan

Initial Stalemate: It is true that the acceleration of hostilities in Sudan is striking. After the outbreak of war in April 2023 between the two parties in power, the battles primarily consisted of stalemates, with each side holding the positions it controlled. Progress from one side towards the other was minimal in the months that followed. “Throughout the year of the war, which began on April 15, 2023, the army made no significant advances except for regaining the headquarters of the National Radio and Television and other areas in Omdurman in March 2024, maintaining a defensive posture to protect other military strongholds” (Al-Rakoba Sudanese website, January 25, 2025).

2. Shifting Momentum: However, the situation on the ground began to shift in September 2024, when the Sudanese army began to regroup and break its strategy of “strategic patience.” It opened multiple fronts against the Rapid Support Forces, capturing key areas like the Halfaya Bridge, the White Nile, and eventually opening the road toward the heart of the capital, Khartoum Bahri. A significant turning point came on November 1, 2025, when the Sudanese army regained control of the city of Wad Madani, which had been under RSF control for over a year. This city, located in the heart of Sudan, is the second largest in the country and is crucial for supply lines to other regions, including the capital area. The loss of Wad Madani was a major blow to the RSF, hampering their ability to resupply their forces and weakening their hold over central Sudan. It was also seen as a decisive battle in the conflict. Following the city’s liberation, Sudanese army commander Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan hinted at plans to launch a sweeping military offensive against the remaining RSF forces in the capital and surrounding areas (Independent Arabia, January 20, 2025).

Second: The Army’s Push in the Capital

Strategic Gains: Following the success in Wad Madani, the Sudanese army launched a series of significant offensives in the capital region. The army announced the regaining of the Khartoum Oil Refinery, located north of Khartoum Bahri, after intense battles that lasted over a year. BBC reported this on January 25, 2025.
Breaking the Siege: On January 24, 2025, Al Arabiya reported that the Sudanese army had lifted the siege imposed by the RSF on the General Command of the Army in Khartoum for over a year and a half. Additional reports confirmed that the army also broke the siege on the Signal Corps camp after fierce battles in central Khartoum Bahri.
Gaining Key Strongholds: The Sudanese army achieved a major breakthrough when it regained control of two strategic military headquarters in Khartoum: the central command and the Signal Corps headquarters. These gains connected the army’s command structure in Khartoum with its northern military area, Wadi Saydna, in Omdurman. In addition, the army recaptured the Jelei Refinery and surrounding military and residential areas (Al-Rakoba Sudanese website, January 25, 2025).On February 4, 2025, Al Arabiya Net reported, “The army and its supporting forces entered the southeastern parts of Khartoum State from Al-Jazeera State.” This was followed by Youm7 reporting on February 2, 2025, that the Sudanese army was reclaiming several villages east of the Nile in Khartoum State.

Third: The Army’s Push to Retake Sudan’s Capital Cities

The Sudanese army’s actions suggest a concerted effort to reclaim Sudan’s three capital cities—Khartoum, Bahri, and Omdurman—from the RSF, restoring them to government control. Burhan has resisted any negotiations with the RSF. In analyzing the ongoing events, several key observations emerge:

Strategic Patience Comes to an End: The Sudanese army’s shift in tactics—from strategic patience to decisive action—has been surprising, especially considering there was no significant military imbalance between the two factions. The army could have acted earlier in the conflict, but the decision to wait until now suggests external factors at play.
RSF’s Retreat: Despite suffering losses in the capital, the RSF has been withdrawing to its stronghold in Darfur, particularly to areas where it controls four out of five capitals. This retreat indicates a shift in the RSF’s focus, leaving the capital region to the Sudanese army while reinforcing their positions in Darfur. Concurrently, clashes in Darfur are intensifying, and the army seems to be facilitating RSF withdrawal toward Darfur.
RSF’s Recruitment in Darfur: According to Independent Arabia (January 20, 2025), the RSF has been recruiting heavily in Darfur, pressuring local tribal leaders to pledge their allegiance. Reports suggest that 50,000 new recruits have joined the RSF ranks, bolstering its position in Darfur.

Fourth: Darfur’s Role in the Conflict

The situation in Darfur is rapidly evolving as the RSF strengthens its grip on the region:

RSF Gains in Darfur: The RSF has recently imposed full control over several areas in North Darfur, including Al-Halaf, Drishqi, and Mao (Independent Arabia, January 20, 2025).
Violent Clashes in Al-Fasher: Violent clashes have erupted in Al-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, between the RSF and Sudanese Joint Forces (including the army, local defense units, and armed resistance groups). This conflict highlights Darfur’s strategic importance to the RSF’s operations (France 24, January 25, 2025).
Tensions Escalate in the West: The RSF launched an attack on Al-Fasher on January 24, 2025, demanding the withdrawal of the Sudanese army and joint forces. The confrontations lasted for over six hours, underlining Darfur’s critical role in the ongoing struggle for control (Independent Arabia, January 25, 2025).These developments suggest a potential division of Sudan into two distinct zones: the Sudanese army controlling central and eastern Sudan, while the RSF solidifies its dominance over Darfur. If this trend continues, Sudan may be heading toward actual division, with Darfur potentially becoming an independent entity under the RSF’s control.

Fifth: International Involvement and the Role of the U.S.

The rapid developments on the ground in Sudan coincide with evolving international actions, particularly from the United States:

U.S. Sanctions: On January 7, 2025, the outgoing Biden administration imposed sanctions on the RSF for committing “genocide in Darfur.” Just days later, on January 16, the same administration sanctioned General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, accusing him of undermining Sudan’s democratic transition (BBC, January 26, 2025).
U.S. Policy Shifts: The U.S. administration under President Trump is making a more pronounced push to influence the situation in Sudan, with an eye toward advancing America’s geopolitical interests. Trump’s administration aims to involve Sudan in the Abraham Accords, which would normalize relations between Sudan and Israel. This could be a significant strategic move as the Trump administration seeks to bolster its legacy and expand its influence in the Middle East and Africa. Additionally, Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssef confirmed that Sudan will review its relationship with the U.S. under the new administration, as part of an effort to navigate the changing geopolitical landscape (Al-Sharq Newspaper, January 23, 2025).

Sixth: The Future of Sudan and International Interests

It is increasingly apparent that the conflict in Sudan is not just a domestic struggle, but one with deep international implications. The rapid shifts in the battlefield reflect the influence of external actors, particularly the United States, which is actively shaping the political and military dynamics. Washington’s strategic interests may ultimately lead to a division of Sudan, with Darfur under RSF control and central Sudan under the army’s rule, reflecting a larger pattern of geopolitical maneuvering.

Conclusion

The ongoing war in Sudan, which has led to tens of thousands of deaths, the displacement of over 12 million people, the collapse of the agricultural system, and the breakdown of key economic sectors, is not merely a product of local power struggles. Rather, it serves the geopolitical interests of global powers, particularly the United States. The forces aligned with General Burhan and Hemeti are fighting a war that aligns with America’s broader strategy to stabilize its influence in Sudan, while pushing back European-affiliated forces. This conflict is, therefore, not just a civil war, but a chess game where the stakes are global power and influence.