Why Now? Unpacking Washington’s Timing on Iran

Recently, U.S. President Donald Trump reignited focus on the Iranian issue, pushing for a swift resolution under the pretext of preventing Iran from developing a nuclear bomb. This renewed attention comes at a time when Washington is shifting its strategic focus toward countering China and reducing entanglements in the Middle East. Trump’s apparent objective is to extricate the U.S. from prolonged regional conflicts in order to redirect resources toward strategic competition with Beijing.

Ironically, Iran—often portrayed as a fierce adversary—has recently made moves that align closely with U.S. interests. The regime has distanced itself from the Palestinian resistance in Gaza, withheld support from Hezbollah in Lebanon, reduced its backing of armed groups in Iraq, and recently announced a withdrawal of support for the Houthis in Yemen. In response to these concessions, Washington appears willing to reengage in nuclear negotiations, potentially lifting economic sanctions in exchange for limiting Iran’s program to civilian use.

Iran has been candid about its motivations: it seeks sanctions relief and a return to dialogue with the U.S. Despite scaling back its regional influence, Iranian leaders—particularly Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei—continue to deliver anti-American rhetoric. However, these statements are widely understood to be performative, aimed at appeasing hardliners within the military and the Revolutionary Guard. Washington tolerates this posturing, recognizing it as part of Iran’s internal balancing act, and understanding that the regime remains economically and militarily constrained by sanctions.

If Iran truly intended to develop nuclear weapons, it likely could have done so by now. From the outset, Khamenei issued a religious edict (fatwa) banning nuclear weapons under Islamic law. Since the 1979 revolution, U.S. policy has used Iran as a kind of “scarecrow”—a manufactured threat to keep Gulf states aligned with Washington and reliant on American military support. The specter of an Iranian nuclear bomb bolstered this narrative, while also placating Iranian hardliners by projecting an image of defiance and ambition.

Under Trump, however, this long-standing strategy has evolved. His administration unilaterally withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal and reoriented U.S. policy to align with the broader goal of countering China. As part of this shift, Washington has entered talks with Saudi Arabia about developing its own civilian nuclear capabilities—a move designed to reassure Riyadh while subtly pressuring Tehran. The implication is clear: should Iran pursue nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia might respond in kind, potentially with Pakistani assistance—an option that has been floated before with U.S. backing.

With Iran likely to reenter global energy markets with fewer restrictions—and alongside Saudi Arabia, as two of China’s key oil suppliers—Washington may be seeking to exert greater influence over China’s energy lifelines. Russia could also play a role in this strategic equation, depending on any private understandings reached between Trump and President Putin regarding Ukraine.

Ultimately, the politics surrounding Iran’s nuclear issue must be viewed within a broader geopolitical framework. Washington elevates foreign policy concerns only when they intersect with its global strategic interests. In this case, Iran is being managed not as a principal threat, but as a distraction—cleared from the table so the U.S. can concentrate more fully on its rivalry with China. This became evident when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, during a recent visit to Washington, remained uncharacteristically quiet as Trump declined to commit to military action against Iran, offering only verbal warnings instead.