U.S. Strategic Interests and the Prospects for a Federal Settlement in Cyprus

Abstract

This article examines recent political developments in Northern Cyprus, particularly the election of Tufan Erhürman as president, and situates them within broader regional and international dynamics. It argues that while local political and socioeconomic factors contributed to Erhürman’s electoral victory, the decisive drivers lie in shifting American strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. These include geopolitical repercussions of the Russia–Ukraine war, natural gas discoveries, Britain’s post-Brexit decline, and evolving U.S.–Turkey relations. The article contends that these factors have produced a renewed American push toward the reunification of Cyprus under a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal framework, with significant implications for Turkey, Greek Cypriots, and Turkish Cypriots alike.

Introduction

On 10 November 2025, the Turkish presidency announced that the newly elected president of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), Tufan Erhürman, would visit Ankara on 13 November 2025 at the invitation of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This visit marked Erhürman’s first official foreign engagement following his electoral victory on 19 October 2025, when he won the presidential election decisively in the first round (Anadolu Agency, 10/11/2025).

Erhürman’s election raises important questions regarding the evolving Cyprus issue. During his campaign, Erhürman advocated for the reunification of the island, whereas Erdoğan has for years promoted a two-state solution. This apparent contradiction invites inquiry into the factors behind the rapprochement between Ankara and the new Cypriot leadership, as well as the potential role of the United States in shaping these developments.

I. Electoral Results and Local Dynamics in Northern Cyprus

Tufan Erhürman, leader of the Republican Turkish Party, secured more than 62% of the vote, defeating incumbent president Ersin Tatar, who received less than 36% (RT, 19/10/2025). This outcome is notable because the victorious candidate explicitly campaigned on a platform favoring reunification with Greek Cyprus, while the defeated incumbent endorsed the two-state solution long promoted by Turkey.

From a domestic perspective, several factors contributed to this result. Despite Turkey’s long-standing military presence in Northern Cyprus since its 1974 intervention, the region has remained economically marginalized. Successive Turkish governments failed to transfer sustainable economic models to the north, which increasingly became associated with illicit financial flows and a casino-based economy. In contrast, Greek Cyprus joined the European Union in 2004 and adopted the euro in 2008, reinforcing perceptions of economic disparity and incentivizing reunification among segments of Turkish Cypriot society.

In addition, Northern Cyprus has experienced entrenched secularism. For decades, state institutions restricted religious expression, including prohibitions on headscarves in schools. Although the government briefly lifted these restrictions in April 2025, the Supreme Constitutional Court annulled the decision in September 2025 (Haberler, 25/9/2025), highlighting the persistence of rigid secular norms. Together, economic stagnation and sociopolitical dissatisfaction weakened support for the incumbent administration.

II. International Context: Strategic Shifts and Energy Politics

While domestic factors shaped voter sentiment, they do not fully explain Erhürman’s landslide victory. More decisive were international developments that reconfigured the strategic value of Cyprus.

1. The Russia–Ukraine War

The war in Ukraine intensified American concerns regarding the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean. Anticipating potential Russian dominance in the Black Sea, the United States expanded its military footprint in Greece and reassessed Cyprus as a strategic asset, often described in U.S. strategic discourse as a “fixed aircraft carrier.” Compared to volatile Arab states, Cyprus offers Washington a stable platform for military operations in both Europe and the Middle East.

2. Natural Gas Discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean

Significant natural gas discoveries over the past two decades further elevated Cyprus’s importance. American energy companies already active in the region have sought to expand production and secure pipeline routes to Europe. These developments intensified disputes over maritime boundaries and motivated increased U.S. diplomatic engagement with Cyprus, including regular meetings between American officials and Cypriot leadership since 2018. Following Donald Trump’s return to the presidency in 2025, U.S. efforts to dominate Eastern Mediterranean gas production accelerated, particularly as a means of consolidating Europe’s dependence on American-controlled energy supplies after the reduction of Russian gas imports.

3. Britain’s Post-Brexit Decline

Britain’s diminished global influence after Brexit further altered American calculations. Despite earlier promises of favorable trade agreements, U.S. policy under Trump imposed tariffs that harmed British industry. Consequently, American strategic thinking shifted toward inheriting and repurposing Britain’s residual influence, especially its military infrastructure in Cyprus. Notably, The National Interest published an article in November 2024 advocating for the transfer of Britain’s Akrotiri and Dhekelia bases to U.S. control.

III. The Evolution of American Policy on Cyprus

These strategic considerations contributed to a clear shift in U.S. policy. During Trump’s first term, Washington partially lifted the arms embargo imposed on Cyprus since 1987, a decision renewed annually (Swissinfo, 2/9/2020). The Biden administration expanded this trajectory by signing a defense cooperation framework with Cyprus in September 2024 (Youm7, 10/9/2024).

In a rare diplomatic gesture, U.S. President Joe Biden hosted Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides at the White House in October 2024. Biden explicitly reaffirmed American support for reunifying Cyprus under a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal model (Cyprus News Agency, 30/10/2024). Concurrently, reports emerged regarding the construction of a helicopter base near Larnaca intended for U.S. use (Turkey Today, 29/7/2024).

IV. Turkey’s Position within the American Strategic Framework

Turkey formally opposed the U.S.–Cyprus defense agreement in September 2024 (Turkish Foreign Ministry, 11/9/2024). However, as a state increasingly aligned with American strategic priorities, Ankara’s opposition had limited practical effect. Turkey subsequently engaged in high-level contacts with Greek and Greek Cypriot officials, including rare presidential meetings in multilateral settings (Al-Ittihad News, 7/11/2024).

Turkey’s policy shifts appear closely tied to changes in U.S. administrations. Under Trump’s first term, Ankara escalated tensions with Greece, whereas under Biden it adjusted its stance to align with Washington’s renewed emphasis on European cohesion. This pattern suggests that Turkish policy on Cyprus has become reactive to American direction rather than independently determined.

V. Erhürman’s Presidency and the Prospects of Federation

Following his election, Erhürman emphasized coordination with Turkey in foreign policy while framing his victory as inclusive of all Turkish Cypriots (Al Jazeera Net, 20/10/2025). This rhetoric appears designed to facilitate a gradual shift toward acceptance of a federal settlement. Resistance emerged from Turkish nationalist circles, notably from Devlet Bahçeli, who rejected the election results and called for annexation by Turkey (RT, 19/10/2025). In contrast, Erdoğan promptly congratulated Erhürman and praised democratic maturity in Northern Cyprus (Anadolu Agency, 19/10/2025).

This divergence underscores a broader divide between nationalist opposition voices and Turkey’s governing elite, which increasingly adapts its positions to American strategic priorities.

Conclusion

The evidence suggests that negotiations toward reunifying Cyprus under a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal framework are likely to intensify. Within this model, Greek Cypriots would wield greater influence at the federal level, while Turkish Cypriots would retain limited autonomy within their zone. Turkey, firmly situated within America’s strategic orbit, appears unlikely to mount effective opposition.

If current local, regional, and international conditions persist, the path toward a federally unified Cyprus aligned with American interests may be more viable than at any previous point. Erhürman’s visit to Ankara on 13 November 2025 may thus represent an initial step toward implementing this American-backed vision, potentially accompanied by the withdrawal of Turkish and British forces and the consolidation of U.S. military presence on the island.